



Lobbying and corruption – A general framework
Lobbying and corruption are important features of
many societies and political systems as they consti-
tute the main means,other than voting,through which
private citizens can influence certain parts of the
state apparatus.Yet, for all the vast literature in eco-
nomics (Grossman and Helpman 2001; Potters and
Sloof 1996;Aidt 2003) or political science (Treisman
2007) dedicated to each of these two phenomena, a
clear understanding of the similarities and differ-
ences between them seems to elude us.
A possible explanation for this is that differences be-
tween lobbying and corruption,if any,are unimportant.
Indeed, this is a view that has had some implicit back-
ing from theoretical work in economics: its most suc-
cessful model of lobbying (Grossman and Helpman
1994) could equally be a model of corruption.In it,lob-
byists influence politicians’ policy-making decisions by
providing them with resources. The model only as-
sumes that politicians care about these resources,but it
does not need to specify what they are or why politi-
cians are interested in them. In particular, these re-
sources could equally be money that politicians use to
finance their campaigns or, more simply, bribes.
A more plausible explanation, however, is simply that
for most people the difference between lobbying and
corruption lies in the fact that lobbying is a way of seek-
ing influence which is accepted within the laws of a
given country while corruption is illegal (see the discus-
sions in Lambsdorff 2002 or Begovic 2005).In trying to
understand the underlying differences between these
two phenomena, the fact that something is legal or not,
does not seem a useful distinction in itself, particularly
as different legal systems will disagree on specific exam-
ples, but it does suggest that the underlying difference
between lobbying and corruption might be in the
means used to obtain influence.1 Therefore, lobbying
might be defined as a series of activities that influence
the decision making of state representatives but which
do not provide these representatives with direct gains.
Corruption, on the other hand, consists precisely of
those activities that provide direct gains.Thus,providing
politicians with expert advice in order to influence their
vote on a specific piece of legislation will be interpreted
as lobbying while paying the same politicians to vote in
a certain way will be defined as corruption.
Useful as this distinction may be, it is still capable of
generating confusion. Going back to our previous
example of campaign contributions versus straight-
forward bribes, one could ask to what extent cam-
paign contributions really differ from bribes as they
provide politicians with a direct benefit, especially if
those politicians are really more interested in the
power provided by the offices they are elected to
than in the money.
If discriminating between lobbying and corruption by
the means they employ can sometimes generate con-
fusion (because in many cases it is not clear how dif-
ferent these means really are),another possibility is to
distinguish lobbying from corruption by the targets of
their rent-seeking activity. In recent work (Damania,
Fredriksson and Mani 2004; Campos and Giovannoni
2007 and 2008; Harstad and Svensson 2010), the dis-
tinction proposed is one where corruption is defined
as all of those rent-seeking activities directed at rule
enforcers while lobbying is rent-seeking activity di-
rected at rule makers. Of course, this distinction does
not necessarily correlate well with a distinction based
on the means employed in rent-seeking: it would be
possible,for example,to define lobbying as paying bri-
bes to politicians, which many would define as (po-
litical) corruption. The distinction proposed here is,
however, very useful for several reasons, some con-
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ceptual, others that relate to the possibility of resolv-
ing substantial issues in the empirical literature on
both lobbying and corruption.
At the conceptual level, the distinction is important
because it raises a natural question: if lobbying and
corruption are both risk-seeking activities which op-
erate with different targets, are they complements
or substitutes? The argument that they should be
complements (Damania, Fredriksson and Mani 2004)
is based on the notion that lobbying is mostly direct-
ed at laws that undermine law enforcement, so as to
make corruption easier. The argument that they
should be substitutes (Harstad and Svensson 2010)
relies instead on the idea that lobbying enables the
lobbyist to change the rules,thus making corruption
redundant.
In the final section, I will discuss the empirical evi-
dence which provides some support to the notion
that lobbying and corruption are indeed substitutes.
In light of this, it is worth exploring some of the con-
sequences of these findings. In the Harstad and
Svensson (2010) framework,the choice between lob-
bying and corruption is driven by two contrasting
forces. On the one hand, corruption is inherently
cheaper because, for example, lobbying politicians
to change a given tax law can be a significantly more
expensive activity than paying bribes to a tax inspec-
tor. On the other hand, once lobbyists have succeed-
ed in influencing politicians to their advantage, they
can be confident that the law will be difficult to mod-
ify. Similarly, we can assume that a corrupt tax in-
spector will be probably be asking for another bribe
at every opportunity.In other words,lobbying will be
more expensive, but will also be more effective.The
consequence is that lobbying will tend to be chosen
over corruption by larger firms and in more devel-
oped countries. However, additional consequences
of this substitutability can be explored by taking po-
litical institutions into account.
Lobbying, corruption and political institutions
Specific political institutions, by making it more or
less difficult to pursue lobbying, will have an impact
on rent seekers’ decisions to lobby or choose corrup-
tion.This link between political institutions,lobbying
and corruption (Campos and Giovannoni 2008) is of
particular interest because it provides a new twist on
the significant literature dealing with political cor-
ruption.
One of the main issues is that the most popular mea-
sure of corruption that are used in these studies
(country-levels perception of corruption) can in-
clude both what we define as corruption but also
what we define as lobbying.2 The implication is that
in many cases these previous studies cannot really
address the question of whether political institutions
matter for lobbying and corruption. This is because
the measure of corruption utilised may not actually
capture the ability of rent seekers to influence politi-
cians but may instead be more related to lower level
corruption. If rent seeking at the political and at the
enforcement level are substitutes, then there is a sig-
nificant risk of confusing the two issues because a
particular institution which makes lobbying (or
political corruption) more difficult might actually
end up encouraging corruption at the law enforce-
ment level. This leads to another advantage of the
distinction between lobbying and corruption pro-
posed here: by focusing on the level at which rents
are being sought, it allows for predictions for the
effect that political institutions have on lobbying
and, through substitutability, on corruption.
One of the most important questions in the litera-
tures that link lobbying and corruption with political
institutions is whether the strength of the institutions
themselves impacts on lobbying or corruption. In
other words,how do the strengths and weaknesses of
the democratic process interact with lobbying and
corruption? At first,the answer to this question seems
to be straightforward: stronger democracies have
stronger checks and balances, voters are better able
to monitor what happens at the political level, re-
spect for the rule of law is stronger and so democra-
tisation should help reduce both lobbying and cor-
ruption. It is easy to see, however, that there must
be some caveats to this simple statement. In partic-
ular, one can make the argument that in the initial
phase of democratisation, corruption might be
encouraged because more democracy means less
law enforcement effectiveness. Also, democracy
might bring new forms of corruption, such as vote
buying, which would be quite unnecessary in an
autocratic regime. More generally, many have
argued (Treisman 2007; Montinola and Jackman
2002; and Sung 2004 are just three examples) that
the relationship between democratisation and cor-
ruption may be non-linear. To complicate matters
further, the aforementioned issue of what type of
2 Treisman (2007),who provides a summary of the empirical results
with regard to the relationship between political institutions and
corruption, discusses this issue.corruption is really intended must be taken into
account.With the distinction between lobbying and
corruption as defined here, it is clear that these ar-
guments tend to have more relevance for lobbying
rather than corruption. Democratisation is more
likely to have an impact on lobbying because this is
the phenomenon where the relationship between
firms and politicians is direct and more sensitive to
democratic institutions: bureaucrats are only very
partially accountable even in the most developed
democracies,while the difference between account-
able and unaccountable politicians has an enor-
mous impact on their willingness and ability to
receive rents from firms.
Another democracy-related variable of interest here
is whether the country has a more or less indepen-
dent media.Theoretical work (Besley and Prat 2006)
has emphasised the positive effect of independent
media on the level of political corruption. Empirical
work (e.g., Brunetti and Weder 2003) finds evidence
of that relationship. Here too, however, the country-
level measures of corruption used so far do not cap-
ture the distinction between lobbying and corrup-
tion proposed in our paper. When this distinction is
made,we would expect independent media to have a
stronger negative effect on lobbying than on corrup-
tion as the former is the much more likely target for
media interest.
It is clear that many of the issues that apply to the
interaction between democratisation and lobbying/
corruption also apply to the notion of the stability
of the political system itself (Olson 1965).There is,
however, a separate notion of political stability and
that has to do with how much alternation between
political parties there is in the system. As pointed
out above with reference to the Harstad and Svens-
son (2010) framework, lobbying gains effectiveness
whenever there is less alternation because then leg-
islative commitments taken by ruling politicians are
more reliable. Della Porta (2004) makes the point
that in a system where party identification amongst
voters is low, political corruption will tend to be
higher. If these two observations are put together,
one might identify two opposing effects: a political
system where ideologies do not matter very much is
inherently more favourable to lobbying, but if we
assume (as is natural to do) that weak ideologies
will lead to frequent change in personnel, this will
lead to less lobbying, not more. Which of these ef-
fects will dominate is an issue for empirical analysis
to resolve.
One particular important class of institutions is that
of government forms. Bennedsen and Feldmann
(2002) argue that in congressional systems lobbying
is easier because policy making is made by forming
coalitions on a specific policy and lobbying might be
useful in clarifying benefits and costs to different po-
licy makers.The consequence is that it becomes eas-
ier for the policy supporters to set up a supportive
coalition.In a parliamentary system,where there is a
confidence procedure,it is much more difficult to set
up ad-hoc coalitions for different pieces of legisla-
tion and so the information that lobbies may provide
is less useful. Helpman and Persson (2001) study
how the internal organisation of parliaments affects
lobbying efforts. They argue that in (US-style) con-
gressional systems, policies tend to be more uneven-
ly distributed than in parliamentary systems and that
lobbying reinforces this effect.To the extent that one
can imagine lobbyists to be more likely to be the
winners in the process of legislative bargaining, one
can conjecture that congressional systems provide
more incentives for lobbying. Kunikova (2006) and
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997 and 2000) both
address the impact of an independent executive (a
president) on lobbying.The former argues that pres-
idents are not accountable to a coalition because
they cannot be removed by the legislature and be-
cause the legislature also needs their cooperation for
the policy making process.Therefore, presidents can
find it relatively easy to pursue rent-seeking activi-
ties.The latter, on the other hand, argue that checks
and balances reduce the opportunities for lobbyists
to seek special favours because i) they make it more
clear to voters who is accountable for policy-making
decisions and ii) they provide a process whereby it is
more difficult for different politicians to collude at
the general public’s expense.
Another major institutional component that has
been explored is the role of the electoral system.
There is substantial literature documenting that the
main mechanism through which electoral systems
affect lobbying opportunities is again that of political
accountability. Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003)
argue that decreasing district magnitude is associat-
ed with more lobbying because as district magnitude
decreases, fewer and fewer parties can hope to chal-
lenge.This gives voters less choice and makes it har-
der to hold politicians accountable. At the same
time, closed-party lists where voters do not have a
direct choice of candidates and can only vote for a
given party also reduce accountability and make lob-
bying relatively more effective. Kunicova and Rose-
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Ackermann (2005) agree that closed-party lists are
inherently more amenable to lobbying but also ar-
gue that in majoritarian systems politics is more ad-
versarial and less consensual because of the small
number of parties and so monitoring of one side by
another is stronger. In other words, in majoritarian
systems we are less likely to see parties covering
each other’s backs and therefore we are likely to
have more accountability.Moreover,the large num-
ber of parties reduces accountability because it also
makes it more difficult to attribute responsibility to
specific parties or politicians. So, we should expect
an unambiguously positive effect of closed lists on
lobbying. Higher district magnitude (which cor-
relates highly with proportionality) is expected to
have a negative effect on lobbying if the effect
highlighted by Persson,Roland and Tabellini (2003)
dominates and a positive effect if the effect high-
lighted by Kunicova and Rose-Ackermann (2005)
dominates.
A third major institutional characteristic is the level
of (de)centralisation in a given country. The recent
literature, both theoretical and empirical, has so far
given contrasting results in analyzing the relation-
ship between federalism on the one hand, and lob-
bying and corruption on the other. Once again, one
of the main problems has been that the literature
has not taken into account the distinction between
factors that have a strong relationship with political
institutions and factors for which this relationship is
weaker because the counterparts are bureaucrats,
not politicians. This is particularly important here
because some arguments that have been put for-
ward in discussing the relationship between feder-
alism and lobbying or corruption, critically depend
on this distinction.Thus, for example, one could ar-
gue that decentralisation has a negative impact be-
cause it reduces the quality of bureaucrats. Or one
could argue that yardstick competition between dif-
ferent local entities has a positive impact. Clearly,
the first theory is more relevant to what we have
defined as corruption, which would be likely to in-
crease, while the second theory would be more rel-
evant to our notion of lobbying because politicians
are more vulnerable than bureaucrats to pressure
from voters if their locality is underperforming.
Thus, we would expect a reduced ability to lobby.
Furthermore, a decentralised system should make
lobbying more difficult because a politician’s abili-
ty to commit to certain policies is more limited
when others up and down in the hierarchy can
change things.
The evidence
We have already mentioned that Campos and Gio-
vannoni (2007) show that the effect of corruption on
lobby membership is very important and supports
the notion in Harstad and Svensson (2010) that lob-
bying and corruption are substitutes.They do this in
the context of the transition countries, so that coun-
tries at different levels of development are consid-
ered. The result that corruption and lobbying are
substitutes can be reconciled with that of Damania,
Fredericksson and Mani (2004),who suggest the oppo-
site because they are unable to capture the impact of
lobbying specifically and thus the link between politi-
cal instability and corruption they discover may not
be mediated by lobbying. In addition, Campos and
Giovannoni (2007) can take advantage of data at the
disaggregated level, while Damania, Fredericksson
and Mani (2003) utilise country level data.
Campos and Giovannoni (2008) focus primarily on
political institutions.They show that lobbying is more
likely in democratic countries, where the media are
independent and in contexts in which the overall polit-
ical process is more democratic.The opposite scenario
is true for corruption. Political instability does not
have much of an effect on lobbying but it has a posi-
tive effect on corruption. If we consider the relation-
ship between lobbying, corruption and political insti-
tutions, one of the main concerns is the impact that
forms of government have on the choices firms can
make in terms of lobbying and corruption. The evi-
dence suggests that lobbying is favoured when the
executive has fewer veto powers while corruption is
more prevalent when the executive has greater veto
powers. There is also evidence that federal or decen-
tralised states favour lobbying over corruption.In gen-
eral,lobbying seems to be more effective than corrup-
tion in pure parliamentary and presidential systems.
The reverse is true in semi-parliamentary and semi-
presidential systems.The most natural explanation for
this phenomenon is that the latter systems are inher-
ently less stable.
With respect to electoral rules,there is evidence that
systems with closed lists reduce accountability for
politicians and thus are more conducive to lobbying.
But systems with closed lists are not less conducive
to corruption. This case contradicts the hypothesis
that corruption and lobbying are substitutes.For dis-
trict magnitude, the results seem to be in line with
Persson,Tabellini and Trebbi (2003), who emphasise
the positive effect of district size on reducing lobby-ing: these results again emphasise substitutability in
that the effect on corruption is reversed. Finally,
Campos and Giovannoni (2008) also show that firms
in their sample systematically point to lobbying as
the most effective way of exerting political influence.
Conclusions
Based on our discussion of the relationship between
lobbying and corruption, we argue that the funda-
mental difference between these two phenomena
has to do with where influence is being sought. In
particular, we think lobbying is a rent-seeking activ-
ity aimed at rule makers whereas corruption is a
rent-seeking activity aimed at rule enforcers. Our
discussion emphasises the advantages of this distinc-
tion and,in particular,the fact that thus defined,lob-
bying and corruption are substitutes. The main ad-
vantage is that by focusing on this particular feature,
it is possible to understand the relationship between
lobbying and corruption on the one hand, and polit-
ical institutions on the other.
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